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The number of votes correlates strongly with the money spent in a campaign, but the relation
between the two is not straightforward. Among other factors, the output of a ballot depends on the
number of candidates, voters, and available resources. Here, we develop a conceptual framework
based on Shannon entropy maximization and Superstatistics to establish a relation between the
distributions of money spent by candidates and their votes. By establishing such a relation, we
provide a tool to predict the outcome of a ballot and to alert for possible misconduct either in the
report of fundraising and spending of campaigns or on vote counting. As an example, we consider
real data from a proportional election with 6323 candidates, where a detailed data verification is
virtually impossible, and show that the number of potential misconducting candidates to audit can
be reduced to only nine.
In an effort towards fair electoral processes, regulations
and reforms are constantly on the agenda of many coun-
tries around the world [1]. To avoid that the decision-
making process is dominated by wealth and influence,
the most pertinent processes to legislate are arguably
fundraising and spending [2]. Different countries have
different rules, but in general, candidates and parties are
the ones that report on the financial details of their own
campaigns, what raises obvious doubts over the veracity
of the reported data. As the number of collected votes
correlates with the money spent in the campaign [3], es-
tablishing a quantitative relation between the distribu-
tion of votes and financial resources among the candi-
dates is instrumental to raise flags about possible mis-
conduct.
Within some regulated boundaries, several individuals
or institutions can contribute financially to a campaign.
The value of the contribution is very subjective, depend-
ing on their interests and on the economic and politi-
cal conjecture [5–8]. Thus, predicting the distribution of
funds raised and money spent in a campaign from “first
principles” is likely a hopeless endeavor, challenging the
verification of the reported data. In sharp contrast, the
distribution of votes among candidates is well studied. It
is known to differ for proportional and plural elections,
and to depend on the country, number of candidates,
and money spent in campaigns [9–14]. Different models
were developed to explain this distribution [3, 15–20] as
well as methodologies to identify vote-counting irregu-
larities [21–26]. Here we propose an approach based on
the Shannon entropy maximization and Superstatistics
to disclose a relation between the distribution of finan-
cial resources declared by candidates and the distribution
of their votes in proportional elections.
Given a certain amount of money mi spent by a can-
didate i in the campaign, the conditional probability for
votes money
...
Max. Entropy
Superstatistics
FIG. 1. By employing the principle of maximum entropy un-
der the constraints of a fixed number of voters and candidates,
we derive the conditional probability p(v|mi), that a candi-
date i receives v votes, provided that i spends an amount
of money mi in the campaign. Since the amount of money
spent usually differ from candidate to candidate, the final dis-
tribution of votes should depend on the distribution of money
spent. A formalism based on Superstatistics [4] is then used
to establish a relation between these two distributions.
i to receive v votes is p(v|mi). Since the money spent is
heterogeneously distributed among candidates, the prob-
ability p(v) that a candidate receives v votes is given by,
p(v) =
mmax∑
m=0
p(v|m)p(m) , (1)
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FIG. 2. Empirical data for the 2014 election for federal deputies in Brazil, which counted 6323 candidates, roughly 140 million
voters, and more than 280 million dollars of total investment in campaigns. (A) The average number as a function of the
standard deviation of votes per candidate at the state level, for the top four populated Brazilian states, namely, Sa˜o Paulo (SP,
circles), Rio de Janeiro (RJ, squares), Minas Gerais (MG, diamonds), and Bahia (BA, triangles). For each state, candidates were
grouped by the amount of money that they officially declared to have spent in their campaigns. The dashed line corresponds
to a linear behavior. (B) Distribution of rescaled number of votes v¯ = (v−〈v〉)/σv for Sa˜o Paulo (blue triangles) and the entire
country of Brazil (black circles), where 〈v〉 and σv are the average and standard deviation of the number of votes received by the
candidates in the same interval (logarithmic binning) of money spent. The (red)-dashed line corresponds to p(v) = exp(−v¯−1),
as predicted by Eq. (5), if we assume Z(m) = µ. Following the prediction given by Eq. (5) from our theoretical approach, the
distribution of votes for more than 99% of the candidates follows an exponential distribution. However, it is remarkable that
the number of candidates with votes that deviate more than 6σv (highlighted region) from the average is higher than expected,
suggesting the existence of outliers.
where p(m) is the probability that a candidate spends
an amount of money m in the campaign and mmax is
the maximum amount of money that can be spent (see
Fig. 1). For simplicity, we have considered that m is a
discrete variable and a multiple of ∆m, where ∆m is the
“price of a vote”. Equation (1) is the basis of Superstatis-
tics for non-equilibrium systems [4], a theoretical frame-
work developed to describe the thermal fluctuations of
an ensemble of particles at different effective thermostat
temperatures and consequently different weights for each
configuration. Analogously, in an election, the amount of
money spent differs from candidate to candidate and thus
also the probability that they receive a certain number of
votes. As a consequence, the variable m is the analogue
for elections of the thermostat temperature in a thermal
system.
To calculate p(v|m), let us consider a proportional elec-
tion with Nc candidates and Nv voters. Based on the
principle of maximum entropy [27], p(v|m) should maxi-
mize the Shannon entropy,
S = −
Nc∑
i=1
mi/∆m∑
v=v0
p(v|mi) ln[p(v|m)] , (2)
where v0 and mi/∆m are the minimum and maximum
number of votes that the candidate i can receive. For
simplicity, hereafter we assume that v0 is the same for
all candidates. At this point, two constraints need to be
imposed, as both the number of candidates Nc and voters
Nv are fixed (see Fig. 1). In this way, the first constraint
is then,
Nc∑
i=0
mi/∆m∑
v=v0
p(v|mi) = Nc , (3)
which ensures the normalization of p(v|m), while the sec-
ond one is,
Nc∑
i=0
mi/∆m∑
v=v0
vp(v|mi) = Nv . (4)
By maximizing S subjected to Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain
p(v|m) = 1
Z(m)
e−µv , (5)
where Z(m) is a normalization factor that depends on
m and it is the analogue of the partition function in a
thermal system, given by,
Z(m) =
eµ(1−v0) − e−µm/∆m
eµ − 1 , (6)
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FIG. 3. Results for the 2014 election for federal deputies in the state of Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, with 1364 candidates, more than
32 million voters, and about 58 million dollars of total investment in the campaigns. (A) Number of votes as a function of the
money spent in the campaign for all candidates (gray dots) and the average value within each money group (blue-dark dots).
The (red-)solid line is obtained by a least-squares fit of Eq. (7) to the average data, taking ∆m as a free parameter. The black
circles are outliers, which we defined as the candidates with a number of votes that deviate more than 6σv from the average.
(B) Distribution of the number of votes per candidate. The (red) dots were obtained from the data and the solid line was
calculated from the distribution of money spent in the campaign. Precisely, the solid line is obtained by randomly assigning a
number of votes v for each candidate from the distribution given by Eq. (5), where m is the amount of money officially declared
to have been spent in the campaign. The obtained curve is remarkably consistent with the empirical data over more than five
orders of magnitude.
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier related to the second
constraint (Eq. (4)). Since the number of votes is limited,
p(v|m) decays exponentially for v ∈ [v0,m/∆m] and it is
zero otherwise.
In order to verify if the distribution predicted by
Eq. (5) is compatible with real data, we consider the 2014
election for federal deputies in Brazil, using the dataset
available in Ref. [28]. Each state has its own ballot, with
different candidates and voters. Countrywide, this is an
election with 6323 candidates, roughly 140 million voters,
and more than 280 million dollars invested in campaigns.
We first analyze the results for the top four populated
Brazilian states, namely, Sa˜o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Mi-
nas Gerais, and Bahia. These states have each more than
10 million voters and between 239 (Bahia) and 1364 (Sa˜o
Paulo) candidates. For each state, we grouped the candi-
dates by the amount of money that they reported to have
spent in their campaigns. Figure 2A shows the average
number of votes 〈v〉 received by a candidate as a function
of the standard deviation σv for each money group. For
most data point, the results are consistent with a linear
behavior (dashed line) as expected for an exponential dis-
tribution, where the average and standard deviation are
always equal. To verify the functional dependence of the
distribution, in Fig. 2B shows the distribution of votes,
rescaled as v¯ = (v − 〈v〉)/σv, where 〈v〉 and σv is the
average and standard deviation of the number of votes
per candidate in the same interval (logarithmic binning)
of money spent. The distribution clearly follows the pre-
dicted exponential behavior of Eq. (5) for more than 99%
of the candidates. However, for v¯ > 6 the distribution
deviates from the predicted one (highlighted region in
Fig. 2B). There are nine candidates in this region in the
entire country, with five of them running in Sa˜o Paulo.
This is remarkable, as the theory predicts five in the en-
tire country and only one in Sa˜o Paulo. This observation
raises doubts about these outliers and it could therefore
call for a detailed analysis and validation of their reported
data about the campaign founding.
From the partition function (6), the average number
of votes received by a candidate that spent m money in
the campaign is,
〈v〉 = v0 + 1
eµ − 1 +
1− v0 +m/∆m
1− eµ(1−v0+m/∆m) . (7)
The value of µ is obtained by imposing the second con-
straint (Eq. (4)) and considering ∆m as a free parame-
ter. Figure 3A shows the number of votes per candidate
against the money spent in the campaign (gray circles)
and the average value for candidates in the same money
group (orange circles), where the circles in blue corre-
spond to the outliers. The solid line in Fig. 3A is the
non-linear fit of Eq. 7 to the numbers of votes of all can-
didates as a function of their financial resources, which
gives ∆m = 2.07. As shown, the excellent agreement be-
4tween this fit and the averaged data points extends over
four orders of magnitude, with deviations found only for
candidates with very scarce resources, a fact that can be
explained as follows. For simplicity, we have considered
that the minimum number of votes v0 is the same for
all candidates, obtained by assuming that v0 equals the
average number of votes for candidates who spent less
than 1200 dollars [3]. In general, however, every candi-
date has a different v0, depending on several factors such
as, his/her party, visibility, and social status.
Through Eq. (5), it is also possible to predict, from the
reported amount of money spent by each campaign, the
distribution of votes for an election. As an example, let
us consider again the election in the state of Sa˜o Paulo.
Figure 3B shows the distribution of the number of votes
(red dots) obtained by each candidate. To predict the
distribution of votes for this election, we assigned ran-
domly a number of votes to each candidate from a distri-
bution given by Eq. (5), with m equal to the amount of
money spent in the campaign, as declared by the candi-
date. The solid line in Fig. 3B is the predicted outcome,
which is in excellent agreement with the empirical data.
Once more, in the proposed framework, ∆m is a free pa-
rameter that relates to the amount of money spent by a
candidate campaign and the maximum number of votes
that it can receive. Its value was estimated by fitting
Eq. (7), as explained before.
Conclusions. We have shown, using the principle of
maximum entropy, that the distribution of votes received
by a candidate should follow an exponential distribution
parameterized by the amount of money that was spent
in her/his campaign. This prediction is consistent with
real data from a very large proportional election, with
6323 candidates. Furthermore, as the money spent in
a campaign is heterogeneously distributed among candi-
dates, we developed a framework based on superstatis-
tics to establish the relation between the distribution of
money spent and of votes. Within this framework, it was
possible to predict the outcome of a ballot from the dis-
tribution of money spent, and identify potential cases of
misconduct either in the report of fundraising and spend-
ing or on vote counting.
For several proportional elections, the distribution of
votes per candidate is fat tailed [29], what has motivated
an enthusiastic discussion about the underlying mecha-
nism [11]. As our theoretical approach shows, for an elec-
tion, if all candidates spent the same amount of money in
their campaigns, the expected distribution of votes would
be exponential. So, the fat-tailed distribution is a con-
sequence of an heterogeneous distribution of resources.
This is consistent with the reported power-law distri-
bution of money spent by candidates in the same elec-
tions [3].
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